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Pressekonferenz Andreas Sönnichsen und Herbert Kickl
DAS TRANSKRIPT

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http://www.transgallaxys.com/~kanzlerzwo/index.php?topic=12377.0

http://www.transgallaxys.com/~kanzlerzwo/index.php?topic=11591.msg33051#msg33051

"Wegen nörgelnder Kotzgören die Großeltern ermorden." Wie könnte man anders die folgende Idiotie in einem Satz zusammenfassen?

https://twitter.com/prof_freedom/status/1479883334935273479
[*quote*]
Prof. Freedom @prof_freedom

Aus "2 Wochen" wurden 2 Jahre.
Aus "Solidarität" wurde Spaltung.
Aus Evidenz wurde Vermutung.
Aus "wir müssen die Oma retten" wurde unendliches Leid bei Kindern.
Maßnahmen wurden zur Religion.
Wissenschaftler wurden zu politische Handlanger. Es reicht! Endgültig.
#IchBinRaus


7:30 PM · Jan 8, 2022·Twitter for Android
2,679 Retweets 98 Quote Tweets 9,128 Likes
[*/quote*]

Die Totalverblödung der Bevölkerung hat ein tödliches Ausmaß angenommen. Mehr als ein Viertel der Bevölkerung sind Vollidioten. Und nicht bloß Vollidioten, sondern Charakterschweine, die für ihre Genußsucht andere Menschen sterben lassen.

Nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg war GROSSES ERSTAUNEN UND ENTSETZEN: "Wie konnte DAS bloß geschehen?"

Heute erleben wir die ach so Erstaunten und Entsetzen, wie sie selber andere Menschen umbringen mit ihrem beschissenen Verhalten. Mit dieser Wortwahl halte ich mich noch sehr zurück! Eigentlich hätte man schon längst das Kriegsrecht ausrufen und die Impfgegner internieren müssen. Alle!

Übrigens ist das Thema "Demokratie" jetzt ein sehr gefährliches. Die Mehrheit WILL nämlich die Impfungen. Die Minderheit, das heißt die Impfgegnerschweine, kann sich NICHT auf "Demokratie" herausreden. Für Schweine gilt Demokratie nämlich nicht. Wer andere Menschen umbringt, entweder direkt oder durch sein beschissenes Mörderverhalten, der hat den Rahmen der Demokratie längst verlassen. Früher beförderte man solche Erscheinungen an den Galgen.

Interessanterweise sind ausgerechnet Impfgegner jetzt vornedran, höchstpersönlich ihnen mißliebige Menschen umzubringen. Bundesweit bekannte Impfbefürworter, aber auch impfende Ärzte werden aus dem Untergrund mit dem Tod bedroht und stehen zum Teil schon unter Polizeischutz. Die Verkommenheit der Impfgegner kennt keine Grenzen.

Wobei wir bei einem sehr interessanten Punkt angekommen sind, auch in der öffentlichen Berichterstattung in Foren und Medien: Die Verkommenheit ist nicht auf Impfgegner beschränkt. Die Frage dabei, die wirklich ganz große Frage: Was haben die bisher gemacht? Die waren doch in ihrem bisherigen Leben auch nicht besser.

Der Bodensatz der Bevölkerung kommt jetzt so klar ans Licht wie nie zuvor. Und es sind keine "Randerscheinungen". Es sind keine "zu vernachlässigenden Minimalstgrüppchen". Nein, ES IST MEHR ALS EIN VIERTEL DER BEVÖLKERUNG.

Außer den Schulen (also der indoktrinierenden Lehrerschaft) ist noch eine weitere Gruppe ganz entscheidend für die Hirnmatschkatastrophe verantwortlich: Journalisten. Ginge man jetzt nach dem Verursacherprinzip vor, müßte ein großer Teil der Zeitungen aufgelöst und Rundfunk- und Fernsehsender auf der Stelle geschlossen werden. Und die Journalisten auf der Stelle in den Knast. Lebenslänglich.

Deutschland heute: 116.000 Tote und mehr als 4 Millionen Erkrankte mit bleibenden Organschäden.

Seit Adolf Hitler hat es keine gößere Massentötung in Deutschland gegeben als diese. Menschen sterben zu lassen aus Gier, Genußsucht und grenzenloser Rechthaberei ist Mord. Mord aus niederen Beweggründen. Deutschland ist das Land der Mörder.


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Author Topic: Rotchinas Waffen schlagen in Europa zu  (Read 204 times)

Wrastrolentiks

  • Jr. Member
  • *
  • Posts: 45
Rotchinas Waffen schlagen in Europa zu
« on: September 25, 2021, 01:41:30 AM »

Die Rotchinesen wollen die Erde erobern. Der Feindsender NZZ bringt einen Bericht über Litauische Forscher:

https://www.nzz.ch/technologie/litauen-macht-sicherheitsluecken-in-chinesischen-handys-publik-vermutlich-wegen-eines-politischen-streits-ld.1646831

[*quote*]
Technologie
Litauen macht Sicherheitslücken in chinesischen Handys publik – vermutlich wegen eines politischen Streits
Smartphones von Xiaomi sammeln exzessiv Nutzerdaten und können unliebsame Medieninhalte zensieren. Das hat die Cybersicherheitsbehörde Litauens herausgefunden, wohl nicht ganz zufällig.

Lukas Mäder
22.09.2021, 19.22 Uhr

Die drei Smartphones der chinesischen Hersteller Xiaomi, Huawei und Oneplus, die das litauische Zentrum für Cybersicherheit untersucht hat.
Lithuania Defense Ministry / Reuters
Dass eine nationale Behörde für Cybersicherheit Geräte aus dem Consumer-Bereich intensiv untersucht, kommt selten vor. Zwar wäre das aus Sicht der Nutzer wünschenswert, denn jedes Gerät weist Sicherheitslücken auf. Doch angesichts der schieren Menge von elektronischen Gadgets sind solche Tests in der Breite kaum praktikabel.

Eine Ausnahme hat die litauische Cybersicherheitsbehörde nun bei chinesischen Smartphones gemacht – und prompt auch Sicherheitslücken und heikle Funktionen gefunden. Das geht aus einem technischen Bericht hervor, der am Dienstag der Öffentlichkeit präsentiert wurde.

Die vielleicht brisanteste Erkenntnis betrifft ein 5G-Handy des Herstellers Xiaomi. Das untersuchte Modell Mi 10T, das auch in der Schweiz erhältlich ist, weist einen Filter für politisch heikle Begriffe auf. Gemäss der Untersuchung ist diese Funktion «in der EU-Region» zwar deaktiviert. Sie soll aber aus der Ferne über das Internet aktiviert werden können.

Konkret kann das Handy von Xiaomi gewisse Inhalte unterdrücken. Zumindest auf vorinstallierten Apps werden Medien, die Begriffe wie «Free Tibet», «Democratic Movement» oder «Voice of America» enthalten, gefiltert. Der Nutzer kann sie nicht sehen. Die Blacklist umfasste zum Zeitpunkt der Untersuchung 449 Einträge: Namen und Informationen von politischen und religiösen Gruppierungen. Die Handys aktualisieren die Liste regelmässig über das Internet.

Daten über das Nutzerverhalten werden analysiert
Ein weiterer Vorwurf betrifft die Privatsphäre der Nutzer. Der Mi-Browser, der vorinstallierte Browser von Xiaomi, sammelt umfangreiche Informationen und schickt sie an die Analyseplattform Google Analytics sowie an das chinesische Pendant Sensors Data. Dazu gehören Daten über ausgeführte Applikationen, über deren Konfigurationen oder das Nutzerverhalten – insbesondere die Browser-History. Der Bericht kommt zum Schluss, dass Xiaomi mehr Daten sammle als andere Hersteller von Smartphones.

Die litauische Cybersicherheitsbehörde hat insgesamt drei chinesische Smartphones genauer untersucht, je eines von Xiaomi, von Huawei und von Oneplus. Dabei seien zehn Schwachstellen gefunden worden, von denen ein erhöhtes Sicherheitsrisiko ausgehe, von denen der vorliegende Bericht vier beschreibt. Die übrigen Sicherheitslücken sollen bis Ende 2021 publiziert werden.

Aufgrund der Ergebnisse rät die litauische Regierung vom Kauf chinesischer Smartphones ab. Wer bereits eines besitze, solle es möglichst rasch loswerden, sagte die stellvertretende Verteidigungsministerin laut Reuters bei der Präsentation des Berichts.

Xiaomi weist den Vorwurf der Zensur zurück. Es habe Vorgänge auf seinen Smartphones wie das Suchen nach gewissen Inhalten nie eingeschränkt und werde das nie tun, schreibt Xiaomi in einer Stellungnahme. Zudem halte man sich an die Vorgaben der EU bezüglich Datenschutz.

Die Beziehungen zwischen Litauen und China sind schlecht

Warum die nationale Behörde für Cybersicherheit sich mit chinesischen Smartphones beschäftigt, begründet sie im Bericht explizit. So seien in den letzten Jahren zahlreiche Schwachstellen in den Smartphones von Xiaomi und Huawei entdeckt worden. Die führende Stellung der Anbieter, deren Entwicklung neuer Technologien und deren auffälliges Wachstum in Litauen «macht sie zweifellos zu einem geeigneten Objekt» für eine Sicherheitsuntersuchung.

Doch diese Begründung ist vermutlich nicht die ganze Wahrheit. Denn in den letzten Monaten haben sich die Beziehungen zwischen China und Litauen wegen eines Streits um Taiwan rapide verschlechtert. Die Regierung in Vilnius hatte im August grünes Licht für eine Vertretung Taiwans in Litauen gegeben. Das läuft Chinas Anspruch zuwider, international «ganz China» inklusive Taiwans zu repräsentieren. Im Nachgang hatte China seinen Botschafter abgezogen.
 
Mehr zum Thema
LitauenChinaXiaomi
Die chinesische Botschaft in Vilnius soll nicht von Taiwan repräsentiert werden. (Valda Kalnina / EPA)
Litauen fordert Peking heraus mit der Eröffnung einer Vertretung Taiwans
China hat am Dienstag seinen Botschafter aus der litauischen Hauptstadt Vilnius zurückbeordert und Litauen zu einem reziproken Schritt aufgefordert. Dass das baltische Land eine Vertretung Taiwans zulasse, sei ein Verstoss gegen den Grundsatz, dass nur Peking allein «ganz China» offiziell repräsentieren dürfe.
Rudolf Hermann, Helsinki 12.08.2021
Die baltischen Staaten befürchten, dass es China mit dem Ausbau der Verkehrsinfrastruktur in einer Reihe von europäischen Ländern mehr um eine Spaltung der EU als um eine Stärkung des Welthandels geht. Im Bild der litauische Hafen Klaipeda. (Valda Kalnina / EPA)
Im Baltikum wächst das Misstrauen gegenüber Chinas «neuer Seidenstrasse»
Mit ihren Ostseehäfen und dem Anschluss ans Eisenbahnnetz russischer Breitspur hätten die baltischen Staaten als europäische Umschlagplätze von Chinas «neuer Seidenstrasse» profitieren können. Doch wachsen Befürchtungen über totalitäre Manieren Pekings.
Rudolf Hermann 07.06.2021
Die Kommissionspräsidentin Ursula von der Leyen auf einer Pressekonferenz Ende August in Madrid. (Juan Medina / Reuters)
Die EU laviert hilflos zwischen China und den USA
Mit einer Indopazifik-Strategie versucht Brüssel Antworten auf Chinas Vormachtstreben zu finden. Tatsächlich haben die Europäer in der Region eher wenig zu sagen – wie ein gerade geplatztes U-Boot-Geschäft zwischen Frankreich und Australien zeigt.
Daniel Steinvorth, Brüssel 16.09.2021
NZZ abonnieren
Kontakt
AGB und Datenschutz
Impressum
[*/quote*]
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Wrastrolentiks

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  • Posts: 45
Re: Rotchinas Waffen schlagen in Europa zu
« Reply #1 on: September 25, 2021, 02:20:30 AM »

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Wrastrolentiks

  • Jr. Member
  • *
  • Posts: 45
Re: Rotchinas Waffen schlagen in Europa zu
« Reply #2 on: September 25, 2021, 03:31:54 AM »

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Wrastrolentiks

  • Jr. Member
  • *
  • Posts: 45
Re: Rotchinas Waffen schlagen in Europa zu
« Reply #3 on: September 25, 2021, 03:33:36 AM »

Der Litauische Bericht:

https://www.nksc.lt/doc/en/analysis/2021-08-23_5G-CN-analysis_env3.pdf


[*quote*]
NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
2021-08-23
Assessment of cybersecurity of mobile devices supporting 5G technology sold in Lithuania
ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTS MADE BY Huawei, Xiaomi and OnePlus
Introduction
To ensure the use of secure software and hardware in the country, the National Cyber Security
Centre (NCSC) under the Ministry of National Defence carried out a cyber security assessment of
mobile devices supporting 5G technology sold in Lithuania by Chinese manufacturers. This analysis
presents the results of the assessment of smartphones manufactured by Huawei, Xiaomi and OnePlus.
Huawei, Xiaomi and OnePlus are Chinese IT and consumer electronics manufacturers with an
international presence 1 and a strong presence in the European market 2 . In 2020, these manufacturers
introduced to the Lithuanian market smartphones supporting fifth-generation (5G) mobile technology.
The security assessment was carried out for widely available Huawei P40 5G 3 , Xiaomi Mi 10T 5G 4
and OnePlus 8T 5G 5 mobile devices. Images of the devices examined in the assessment are shown in
Figure 1.
Huawei P40 5G
Xiaomi Mi 10T 5G
OnePlus 8T 5G
Figure 1: The devices examined in the assessment. Front and rear panel views
CNET. “Huawei, OnePlus and beyond: China’s biggest smartphone brands you should know about”.
https://www.cnet.com/news/huawei-oneplus-china-biggest-smartphone-brands-you-should-know-about-lenovo-
meizu-xiaomi-oppo-vivo/
2
Counterpoint. European Smartphone Market Down 14 % YoY in 2020; Xiaomi Gains While Huawei
and Samsung Lose. https://www.counterpointresearch.com/european-smartphone-market-2020/
3
Huawei. Technical parameters of Huawei P40 5G. https://consumer.huawei.com/en/phones/p40-
pro/specs/
4
Xiaomi. Technical parameters of Xiaomi Mi 10T 5G. https://www.mi.com/global/mi-10t-pro/specs/
5
OnePlus. Technical parameters of OnePlus 8T 5G. https://www.oneplus.com/lt/8t/specs
1NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
Despite these brands being well-known, in the 2017-2021 period the corporations faced security
challenges for the equipment being developed; according to the CVE database (Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures), 9 vulnerabilities 6 related to the risk of personal data leaking were
identified for Xiaomi’s production (8 of these vulnerabilities could be realised by remote means), 144
vulnerabilities 7 were identified for Huawei’s products during this period (28 vulnerabilities were
identified in 2020; 23 in the first half of 2021), most of which were related to disruption of device
functionality, and one vulnerability was identified in 2020 allowing an attacker to use third-party
software to send SMS text from a mobile device when the mobile device was locked. 8
Various sources assess that these manufacturers have a leading position 9,10 in the mobile device
market, and their wide assortment of products, their development of new technologies and their
noticeable growth in Lithuania undoubtedly make them an appropriate object for cyber security
research.
Conclusions of the study
Decomposition analysis performed on mobile devices manufactured by Huawei, Xiaomi and
OnePlus identified 10 instances of increased cybersecurity risk. This cybersecurity assessment
analyses 4 cybersecurity risks related to the general security of factory-installed applications in the
devices, threats of leakage of personal data, and restrictions on freedom of expression. It is planned to
describe in detail the other cybersecurity risks identified in this comprehensive study, and to present
the assessment of such risks by the end of 2021. This analysis examines issues related to the security
of personal data.
The analysis showed that the process of installing mobile applications on Huawei devices is
characterised by cybersecurity uncertainties. For the installation of mobile applications on Huawei
phones, a manufacturer-based infrastructure is used, which consists of the official electronic
application store AppGallery and peripheral application distribution platforms.
When the user intents to install the mobile application on a Huawei device, a search for the mobile
application is performed in the AppGallery store; when the application is found, it is downloaded and
installed on the mobile device. However, if the application is not found in the official store, the user is
automatically directed to peripheral application distribution platforms, from which the mobile
application is downloaded to the mobile device for installation. It is worth noting that most of the
application distribution platforms are located in countries not covered by the General Data Protection
Regulation, which creates a corresponding risk of leakage of user metadata. The study found that a
portion of the mobile applications contained on the application distribution platforms are imitations of
the original applications, with malicious functionality or virus infestation; such applications can be
downloaded and installed by the user on the mobile phone, thereby jeopardising the security of the
device and the data contained in it.
Data security risks have also been identified in the Xiaomi device; factory-installed system
applications send statistical data on the activity of certain applications installed on the device to
servers of the Chinese cloud service provider Tencent, located in Singapore, the USA, the
6
CVE
database.
Publicly
announced
vulnerabilities
in
Xiaomi
products.
https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-19038/MI.html
7
CVE
database.
Publicly
announced
vulnerabilities
in
Huawei
products.
https://www.cvedetails.com/vendor/5979/Huawei.html
8
CVE
database.
Publicly
announced
vulnerabilities
in
OnePlus
products.
https://www.cvedetails.com/vendor/16036/Oneplus.html
9
BusinessChief. https://businesschief.asia/technology/chinese-smartphone-brand-xiaomi-beats-apple-
europe-sales
10
Fortune. https://fortune.com/2020/11/25/xiaomi-third-quarter-results-largest-western-europe/
2NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
Netherlands, Germany and India.
It was found that the original browser of the device, Mi Browser, uses two data collection
modules: Google Analytics and Sensor Data. The Google Analytics module installed on the device
allows the browsing and search history to be read, to send this data to analytics servers which Xiaomi
accesses and the data of which Xiaomi uses 11 . This functionality is activated by registering the mobile
phone into the Xiaomi User Experience marketing programme. By default, this is automatically done
during the phone’s first activation or when reset to factory settings.
The Sensor Data module used in the device has been found to collect statistical information on 61
parameters (time of activation of application, language used, etc.) about the activity of applications
used. The collected statistics are sent via an encrypted channel to Xiaomi servers in Singapore, which
is not covered by the General Data Protection Regulation. According to international sources, clear
cases of unauthorised collection of user data by Xiaomi have been identified 12,13 . Potentially excessive
collection and use of analytical data can be said to pose a threat to the privacy of personal data.
It has also been established that when a user chooses to use Xiaomi cloud services, the user’s
mobile phone number is registered on servers located in Singapore. This is done by the device sending
an encrypted SMS message to a special phone number. After receiving the SMS message, the server
synchronises it with the Xiaomi server in Singapore, from which the phone downloads a confirmation
via mobile internet, allowing the user to connect to the Xiaomi cloud service. It has been established
that the registration of a telephone number is carried out regardless of whether the user chooses to be
authenticated by phone number or by e-mail address. It is important to note that the encrypted and
sent SMS message and its addressee are not visible to the user.
The automated sending of messages and the software functionality of their concealment pose
potential threats to the security of the device and personal data; in this way, without the user’s
knowledge, device data can be collected and transmitted to remote servers.
The Xiaomi Cloud service is designed to store and synchronise the data stored on the device (data
stored in the contact book, call history, SMS messages, photos, notes, Wi-Fi settings and browsing
history, etc.) on remote servers. Using this service, user data is sent to servers located in Singapore.
Xiaomi system applications (Security, MiBrowser, Cleaner, MIUI Package Installer and Themes)
have been found to regularly download the manufacturer’s updated configuration file
MiAdBlacklistConfig from a server located in Singapore. This file contains a list composed of the
titles, names and other information of various religious and political groups and social movements (at
the time the analysis was performed, 449 records were identified in the MiAdBlacklistConfig file).
Analysis of the Xiaomi application code showed that the applications have implemented software
classes for filtering the target multimedia displayed on the device according to the downloaded
MiAdBlacklistConfig list.
This allows a Xiaomi device to perform an analysis of the target multimedia content entering a
phone: to search for keywords based on the MiAdBlacklist list received from the server. When it is
determined that such content contains keywords from the list, the device blocks this content. It is
thought that this functionality can pose potential threats to the free availability of information.
NCSC recommends that users take an interest in the software and hardware used, and responsibly
evaluate the proposed functionality of the equipment.
11
Xiaomi. Privacy Policy. https://privacy.mi.com/all/en_IN/
Forbes information. https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2020/04/30/exclusive-warning-over-
chinese-mobile-giant-xiaomi-recording-millions-of-peoples-private-web-and-phone-use/
13
Android Authority information. https://www.androidauthority.com/xiaomi-privacy-cheap-phone-
1118444/
12
3NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
Details of the research
The main software characteristics of the mobile devices included in the analysis are listed in Table
1, indicating the operating system (OS) basis, the manufacturer’s modification of the operating system
basis, the version of the operating system kernel and the dates of security updates.
Table 1. Main software characteristics of mobile devices included in the analysis
Name of device Huawei P40
Factory-installed OS basis Android 10
Manufacturer’s modification of
factory-installed OS basis
Latest available OS basis
Manufacturer’s modification of the
latest available OS basis
Latest available OS release date
OS kernel version
Initial
security update package level
Date of most recent security update
Number of security updates
EMUI 10.1.0
Xiaomi Mi 10T
Android 10
(QKQ.200419.0P2)
MIUI Global 12.0.10
(QJDEUXM)
Android 11
OnePlus 8T
Oxygen OS
11.0.5.6.KB05BA
Android 11
Android 11
Android 10
EMUI
11.0.0.151
(C432E5R5P3)
2020-12-24
4.14.116 MIUI Global 12.0.2.0
(RJSEUXM) Oxygen OS
11.0.8.13.KB05AA
2021-05-25
4.19.81-pref-gef23740 2021-04-08
4.19.110-pref+
2020-04-01 2020-09-01 2020-10-01
2021-06-01 14
9 2021-03-01 15
3 2021-04-01 16
4
All mobile devices examined are based on the Android operating system; Huawei P40 and Xiaomi
Mi 10T use system version 10, while OnePlus 8T uses what is currently the latest system version, 11.
It is worth noting that by default the standard Android 11 operating system has wider access control
capabilities, 17 enabling the user to better control the access of applications to data stored on the
device.
Android operating system security updates are updates to the components of the operating system,
designed to correct software vulnerabilities that threaten the security of the device or the data stored
on it. These updates are focused on software vulnerabilities allowing remote code execution, elevation
of privilege, information disclosure (information leakage), denial of service and other types of attacks.
Each of these security updates fixes between 20 and 60 security vulnerabilities listed in the CVE
database. It is worth noting that the harmfulness of vulnerabilities ranged between 5.4 and 10.0 points
(out of a possible 10 points).
For this reason, it is important for mobile device users to install these updates regularly. These
Android operating system security updates are released periodically, every 1-3 months. Xiaomi has
committed to delivering these updates to its devices for 2 years 18 , and OnePlus has made such a
commitment for a period of 3 years 19 . Huawei’s commitments to supply updates of the operating
14
15
Huawei information. https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/
Adimorah blog information. https://adimorahblog.com/new-stable-update-for-the-mi-10t-and-mi-10t-
pro/
16
OnePlus information.
https://www.oneplus.com/global/support/softwareupgrade/details?code=PM1605596915581
17
Android Authority information. C. Scott Brown, The best Android 11 features you need to know
https://www.androidauthority.com/android-11-features-1085228/
18
Xiaomi information. https://www.mi.com/global/service/support/security-update.html
19
OnePlus information. https://forums.oneplus.com/threads/oneplus-software-maintenance-
schedule.862347/
4NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
system or operating system security updates were not found. It is worth noting that the maker of the
Android operating system, Google, releases security updates for unmodified versions of the Android
Open Source Project. For this reason, operating system updates and operating system security updates
are available earliest for devices manufactured by Google.
On the other hand, device manufacturers such as Huawei, Xiaomi, OnePlus and others have to
adapt the operating system updates or operating system security updates to the manufacturer’s
modifications of the operating system basis, so such updates are only available later for these
manufacturers’ mobile devices. It is particularly important to emphasise that the latest security
updates are available only for the Huawei P40 mobile device. The analysis found that the latest
security update for the Xiaomi Mi 10T was 3 months old, and the latest security update for the
OnePlus 8T mobile device was 2 months old.
The NCSC notes that, in accordance with the above information, timely security updates for
existing devices are essential.
1.
Huawei’s official store AppGallery directs users to third-party e-shops in which the
applications are malicious or virus-infected
The analysis showed that the process of installing mobile applications on Huawei devices is
characterised by cybersecurity uncertainties. For the installation of mobile applications on Huawei
phones, a manufacturer-based infrastructure is used, which consists of the official electronic
application store AppGallery and peripheral application distribution platforms (APKMonk, APKPure,
Aptoide, etc.). A diagram of the Huawei e-shop is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Diagram of Huawei’s mobile-application e-shop
5NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
Huawei’s mobile-application e-shop infrastructure consists of two blocks: the internal Huawei
AppGallery infrastructure and third-party application distribution platforms. Its own Huawei
AppGallery infrastructure has been determined to be located in Spain, the USA, Germany, Sweden,
the Netherlands, Hong Kong and Thailand. This infrastructure is integrated with third-party
distribution platforms, of which the three best-known operate in the USA, Ireland and the
Netherlands. According to various sources 20 , Huawei’s mobile-application distribution infrastructure
currently includes 6-8 third-party distribution platforms. Information about Huawei’s mobile-
application distribution infrastructure is presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Information about the Huawei mobile-application distribution infrastructure, indicating
the parameters for the internal Huawei AppGallery and the three best-known integrated external
distribution platforms
Line
No.:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
Infrastructure Address: IP address State
Internal Huawei
AppGallery appdl-1-drcn.dbankcdn.com.c.cdnhwc1.com
pay7.hicloud.com
appdl-11-dre.dbankcdn.com
appdl-11-drcn.dbankcdn.com
appdl-2-drcn.dbankcdn.com.cdn.dnsv1.com
uc3.hispace.hicloud.com
sdkserver-dre.op.hicloud.com
HWID-dre.platform.hicloud.com
appdl-12-drcn.dbankcdn.com.akamaised.net
appdl-12-dre.dbankcdn.com.akamaised.net
appdl-1-dre.dbankcdn.com.c.cdnhwc1.com
appdl-1-dre.dbankcdn.com.c.cdnhwc1.com
appstore.huawei.com
metrics2.data.hicloud.com
www.hicloud.com
query.hicloud.com
grs.dbankcloud.com
Jos.hicloud.com
iap.hicloud.com
appdl-2-dre.dbankcdn.com.cdn.dnsv1.com
appdl-2-drcn.dbankcdn.com.cdn.dnsv1.com
appdl-4-drcn.dbankcdn.com
appdl-4-drcn.dbankcdn.com 223.119.20.17
14.137.149.80
13.32.111.63
65.9.52.144
211.152.136.88
23.14.13.247
104.69.222.105
104.69.222.145
184.31.15.17
184.31.15.51
119.46.76.15
119.46.76.17
80.158.2.135
80.158.2.190
80.158.19.100
80.158.19.121
80.158.20.103
80.158.23.247
80.158.40.92
101.33.11.29
101.33.11.45
163.171.128.127
163.171.128.129 Hong Kong
Spain
the USA
the USA
the Netherlands
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Thailand
Thailand
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
www.apkmonk.com 104.26.4.35 the USA
download.apkpure.com 104.20.83.194 the USA
en.aptoide.com
ws75.aptoide.com
ws75.aptoide.com
en.aptoide.com
rakam-api.aptoide.com
pnp.aptoide.com
en.aptoide.com
ws75.aptoide.com
CDN-mobile.aptoide.com
pool.apk.aptoide.com
apkins.aptoide.com
apkins.aptoide.com 34.249.219.183
34.254.115.204
52.17.222.230
52.50.137.60
52.209.136.146
54.194.247.193
54.220.86.7
54.229.235.132
172.67.29.206
5.79.110.134
95.211.168.137
95.211.223.52 Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
the USA
the Netherlands
the Netherlands
the Netherlands
External platform
APKMonk
External platform
APKPure
External platform
Aptoide
20
XDA-Developers information. https://www.xda-developers.com/petal-search-download-apps-huawei-
honor-smartphones-hms/
6NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
When the user installs a mobile application on a Huawei device, a search for the mobile
application is performed in the AppGallery store; when the application is found, it is downloaded and
installed on the mobile device. The mobile-application installation scheme using the Huawei
AppGallery platform is presented in Figure 2.
When the name of an application is entered in the search box of the Huawei AppGallery
application, a list of search results is generated. The search results window contains the Petal Search
section. When the Petal Search is selected, the user is shown a list of applications accessible through
third-party application distribution platforms (1). When a user selects an application from this section,
a warning message (2) is displayed. The warning message indicates that further actions will occur
outside the Huawei AppGallery application.
When the user closes the warning window, the web browser is opened on the device, the user is
redirected to the third-party application distribution platform. If the user selects the application-
installation file download option (3) on the platform, the file is downloaded and saved in the device’s
internal memory (4, 5). Once the device completes the process of downloading the application-
installation file, the installation of the application starts.
Since in this case the installation of the application is initiated by the web browser of the device,
the user is shown an information window (6) requesting authorisation to initiate the application
installation procedure using the web browser. Once the user has given permission, an application-
installation window (7) is shown, which again requests user input to start the installation. Once the
user has reconfirmed the application-installation, the application is installed (8, 9) and an icon for the
newly-installed application is added to the main window (10).
Figure 2: Mobile application installation scheme using the Huawei AppGallery platform
If the application being searched for is not available in the Huawei AppGallery store, the user is
7NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
automatically redirected to peripheral third-party application distribution platforms, from which the
mobile application is downloaded to the phone for installation.
The analysis found that a portion of the mobile applications available at such distribution platforms
are fakes of the authentic applications, with malicious functionality or virus infestation; such
applications can be downloaded and installed by the user on a mobile phone, thereby jeopardising the
security of the device and the data contained in it.
A schematic diagram of the installation of a Huawei application, including third-party distribution
platforms for their installation, is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Schematic diagram for the installation of a Huawei application, including third-party
distribution platforms
It is worth noting that part of the application-distribution infrastructure used by Huawei is located
in countries not covered by the General Data Protection Regulation. It is important to note that a
mobile device downloading an application from a mobile-application e-shop located in a country
covered by the GDPR can execute requests to third countries not covered by the Regulation. This
creates a corresponding risk of leakage of user metadata.
The analysis examined the AppGallery e-shop operating in the Huawei infrastructure and three of
the best-known integrated third-party distribution platforms, APKMonk, Aptoide and APKPure. It is
worth noting that information on APKMonk and APKPure developers could not be found in freely-
available sources. According to Aptoide 21 , the headquarters of the distribution platform is registered
in Portugal (Lisbon), and the company’s branches operate in China (Shenzhen) and Singapore.
The analysis monitored traffic as applications were downloaded from sources used in the Huawei
infrastructure. During the research, applications were searched for in the Huawei AppGallery e-shop,
without changing the sequence for download of applications as originally set by the manufacturers;
the applications were downloaded directly from the original e-shop and from the third-party
application distribution platforms provided by AppGallery.
When recording the number of connections, it was found that during the downloading of an
application from the original AppGallery e-shop, requests to 38 addresses were identified, and in the
21
Aptoide information. https://en.aptoide.com/company/about-us
8NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
case of APKMonk, 56 addresses. The highest number of requests was identified for Aptoide and
APKPure; respectively, 74 and 73 addresses.
Information illustrating Huawei mobile device requests during application download procedures is
shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Number of Huawei mobile device requests during application download procedures
More detailed information on the countries to which the requests were directed and the number of
such requests is given in Figures 5 through 7.
Figure 5: Huawei AppGallery request
information
Figure 6: Distribution platform APKMonk
request information
9NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
Figure 7: Distribution platform Aptoide
request information
Figure 8: Distribution platform APKPure
request information
More detailed analytical information with specific IP addresses and countries is provided in Table 3.
Table 3. More detailed analytical information with specific IP addresses and countries
Line
No.:
Huawei AppGallery
Address
State
APKMonk
Address
Aptoide
State
apkrep.ns1.ff.
avast.com
appdl-1-
drcn.dbankcd
n.com.c.cdnh
wc1.com
pay7.hicloud.
com Czechia 34.250.145.50 Ireland
Hong Kong 52.209.136.146 Ireland
Spain 5.62.53.15 Czechia
4 8.8.8.8 the USA appimg3.dbank
cdn.com the USA
5 appdl-11-
dre.dbankcdn.
com the USA 13.33.242.107 the USA
6 13.33.242.98 the USA the USA
1
2
3
7
8
9
10
13.107.213.4
4
52.177.138.1
13
appdl-11-
drcn.dbankcd
n.com
152.199.21.2
30
the USA
the USA
auction.unityads
.unity3d.com
odr.mookie1.co
m
auction.unityads
.unity3d.com
the USA
the USA
the USA auction.unityads
.unity3d.com the USA
the USA EU-u.openx.net the USA
id.rlcdn.com the USA
11 5.62.36.56 the UK
12 appdl-2-
drcn.dbankcd the
Netherlands
52.85.48.221
the USA
Address
APKPure
State Address State
i.w.inmobi.com Ireland apkrep.ns1.ff.av
ast.com Czechia
en.aptoide.com Ireland sync.crwdcntrl.
net Ireland
Ireland 52.209.246.140 Ireland
Ireland 13.32.111.63 the USA
webservices.apt
words.net Ireland feeds.apyhi.com the USA
en.aptoide.com Ireland 34.98.67.61 the USA
Ireland 34.236.65.196 the USA
Ireland rtb.openx.net the USA
Ireland 35.244.159.8 the USA
Ireland 35.244.174.68 the USA
Czechia 65.9.52.144 the USA
Czechia download.apkp
ure.com the USA
ws75.aptoide.co
m
ws75.aptoide.co
m
rakam-
api.aptoide.com
pnp.aptoide.co
m
en.aptoide.com
ws75.aptoide.co
m
apkrep.ns1.ff.av
ast.com
5.62.53.117
10NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
n.com.cdn.dn
sv1.com
www.petalsea
rch.com
uc3.hispace.hi
cloud.com
sdkserver-
dre.op.hiclou
d.com
HWID-
dre.platform.h
icloud.com
appdl-12-
drcn.dbankcd
n.com.akamai
sed.net
appdl-12-
dre.dbankcdn.
com.akamaise
d.net
appdl-1-
dre.dbankcdn.
com.c.cdnhw
c1.com
appdl-1-
dre.dbankcdn.
com.c.cdnhw
c1.com
France 52.154.69.245 the USA
Sweden 65.9.53.128 the USA
Sweden 104.21.35.78 the USA
Sweden www.apkmonk.
com Sweden
wv.inner-
active.mobi
wv.inner-
active.mobi
the USA 104.26.4.35 the USA
the USA partner.googlea
dservices.com the USA
8.8.8.8 the USA pagead2.google
syndication.com the USA
the USA test.quantcast.m
gr.consensu.org the USA 142.250.74.100 the USA
104.197.172.31 the USA quantcast.mgr.c
onsensu.org the USA s0.2mdn.net the USA
Sweden partner.googlea
dservices.com the USA auction.unityads
.unity3d.com the USA firebaseremotec
onfig.googleapi
s.com the USA
Thailand 142.250.74.35 the USA Publisher-
config.unityads.
unity3d.com the USA app-
measurement.co
m the USA
Thailand adservice.googl
e.com the USA www.datadoghq
-browser-
agent.com the USA adservice.googl
e.com the USA
21 appstore.hua
wei.com Germany 142.250.74.100 the USA sdktm.w.inmobi
.com the USA Firebase-
settings.crashlyt
ics.com the USA
22 80.158.2.189 Germany 142.250.74.102 the USA rules.quantcoun
t.com the USA 142.250.74.136 the USA
23 metrics2.data.
hicloud.com Germany 142.250.74.129 the USA 104.21.35.78 the USA 142.250.74.142 the USA
24 80.158.16.16
1 Germany 142.250.74.130 the USA config.inmobi.c
om the USA Sync-
tm.everesttech.n
et the USA
Germany um.simpli.fi the USA 142.250.74.2 the USA 152.199.21.230 the USA
the USA 172.67.68.182 the USA
the USA 172.217.20.33 the USA
the USA googleads.g.dou
bleclick.net the USA
the USA 172.217.20.35 the USA
the USA tpc.googlesyndi
cation.com the USA
the USA 172.217.21.130 the USA
25
26
27
28
www.hicloud.
com
query.hicloud
.com
grs.dbankclou
d.com
80.158.20.10
4
Germany
Germany
Germany
172.67.29.206
tpc.googlesyndi
cation.com
googleads4.g.do
ubleclick.net
the USA
the USA
the USA
www.googletag
manager.com
partner.googlea
dservices.com
connectivityche
ck.gstatic.com
firebaseinstallati
ons.googleapis.
com
cdn.ampproject.
org
adservice.googl
e.com
29 Jos.hicloud.co
m Germany www.gstatic.co
m the USA 30 iap.hicloud.co
m Germany 172.217.21.161 the USA Germany ade.googlesyndi
cation.com the USA Germany cm.g.doubleclic
k.net the USA www.google.co
m the USA www.gstatic.co
m the USA
Germany 192.48.236.3 the USA pagead-
googlehosted.l.g
oogle.com the USA ade.googlesyndi
cation.com the USA
the UK 142.250.74.130 the USA www.google.co
m the USA
the USA 172.217.21.166 the USA
the USA 172.217.21.170 the USA
the USA 172.217.22.162 the USA
31
32
33
80.158.54.98
appdl-2-
dre.dbankcdn.
com.cdn.dnsv
1.com
appdl-2-
drcn.dbankcd
n.com.cdn.dn
sv1.com
34 160.44.194.8
6 Germany
35 160.44.199.4 Germany
36
37
160.44.207.2
13
appdl-4-
drcn.dbankcd
n.com
Pixel-
sync.sitescout.c
om
openx2-
match.dotomi.c
om
the UK
Germany 91.228.74.189 the UK
Germany image6.pubmati
c.com the UK
Firebase-
settings.crashlyt
ics.com
softonic.map.fas
tly.net
api.facebook.co
m
11NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
38
appdl-4-
drcn.dbankcd
n.com
188.125.94.206 the UK
39 81.171.20.104 the
Netherlands
40 95.211.137.160 the
Netherlands
41 ib.adnxs.com the
Netherlands
42 store3.hispace.h
icloud.com Sweden
43 104.73.93.58 Sweden
44 tls.adobe.com Sweden
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
Germany
sdkserver-
dre.op.hicloud.c
om
sdkserver-
dre.op.hicloud.c
om.edgekey.net
j.mrpdata.net
23.193.116.193
metrics2.data.hi
cloud.com
platform.hiclou
d.com
grs.dbankcloud.
com
connect.faceboo
k.net
www.facebook.
com
CDN-
mobile.aptoide.
com
tpc.googlesyndi
cation.com
fonts.gstatic.co
m
pagead-
googlehosted.l.g
oogle.com
adservice.googl
e.com
the USA raw.githubuserc
ontent.com the USA
the USA 216.58.207.206 the USA
the USA www.gstatic.co
m the USA
the USA
the USA
firebaseinstallati
ons.googleapis.
com
cm.g.doubleclic
k.net
the USA
the USA
the USA 216.58.211.130 the USA
the USA ad.turn.com the UK
Sweden fonts.googleapis
.com the USA 185.29.135.233 the UK
Sweden ads.mopub.com the USA 185.64.190.78 the UK
Germany ads.mopub.com the USA 212.82.100.176 the UK
the USA 51.75.146.159 France
Germany
Germany
app-
measurement.co
m
pixel.quantserve
.com
the UK
pixel.onaudienc
e.com
D-
08.winudf.com
France
Germany 185.64.190.78 the UK
France
Germany data.flurry.com the UK green.erne.co France
the
Netherlan
ds
the
Netherlan
ds
the
Netherlan
ds dsum-
sec.casalemedia
.com Sweden
store3.hispace.h
icloud.com Sweden
52 appgallery.clou
d.huawei.com Germany pool.apk.aptoid
e.com 53 JFS-
dre.jos.hicloud.
com Germany apkins.aptoide.c
om 54 80.158.34.57 Germany apkins.aptoide.c
om 55 160.44.199.4 Germany id5-sync.com France 56 160.44.202.175 Germany 51.255.81.18 France 2.18.33.213 Sweden 3.66.135.160 Germany
tracking.justpre
mium.com Germany
57
sdkserver-
dre.op.hicloud.c
om.edgekey.net
HWID-
dre.platform.hic
loud.com
sdkserver-
dre.op.hicloud.c
om
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
58 z.moatads.com Sweden 59 store3.hispace.h
icloud.com Sweden 49.51.130.46 Germany
Sweden pixel.rubiconpr
oject.net.akadns
.net Germany
Sweden 80.158.2.189 Germany
Sweden metrics2.data.hi
cloud.com Germany
60
61
62
d.applovin.com
sdkserver-
dre.op.hicloud.c
om
sdkserver-
dre.op.hicloud.c
om.edgekey.net
63 cdn2.inner-
active.mobi Sweden OAuth-login-
dre.platform.db
ankcloud.com Germany
64 webview.unitya
ds.unity3d.com Sweden 80.158.19.69 Germany
65 api.vungle.com Germany 80.158.19.100 Germany
12NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
ads.api.vungle.c
om
metrics2.data.hi
cloud.com
OAuth-login-
dre.platform.db
ankcloud.com
JFS-
dre.jos.hicloud.
com
cloud.hicloud.c
om
66
67
68
69
70
Germany 80.158.19.121 Germany
Germany 80.158.20.104 Germany
Germany JFS-
dre.jos.hicloud.
com Germany
Germany 80.158.34.57 Germany
Germany grs.dbankcloud.
com Germany
71 80.158.40.21 Germany 80.158.44.234 Germany
72 appdlssl.hicloud
.com Germany 101.33.11.48 Germany
73 160.44.199.4 Germany 160.44.199.4 Germany
74 connectivityche
ck.platform.hicl
oud.com Germany
The analysis found that when downloading an application from the Huawei infrastructure, a
redirection to third-party application distribution platforms was carried out, from which applications
with potentially malicious code were downloaded. A summary of the security analysis of mobile
applications downloaded by a Huawei device from the Huawei infrastructure is presented in Table 4.
The security analysis was performed with the well-known file analysis tool VirusTotal 22 .
Table 4. Summary of downloaded mobile applications after inspection using VirusTotal
Line
No.: Application
name Identifier Application
version
1 Social Media com.social.messenger.allinon
eapps 14
2 Web Machinist
Mobile Pro
Tapping com.webmachinist.cncmachi
nisttappingcalculator 1.0
3 Messenger All
in One comm.essagechat.listing 28.0
VirusTotal result
Malicious software:
A.gray.andrsca.f
Virus:
Trojan.Trojan.Banker.Andr
oidOS.Agent.ed
Malicious software:
Adware/Loead for
Android.fyben.a
The research analysed three mobile applications downloaded from Huawei mobile application
distribution infrastructure servers. According to VirusTotal scanning data, it was determined by one
antivirus system that potentially malicious software, A.gray.andrsca.f, was installed in the Social
Media application. After examining another mobile application, Web Machinist Mobile Pro Tapping,
downloaded from Huawei infrastructure servers, one VirusTotal antivirus system identified a potential
virus, Trojan.Trojan.Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ed. This virus can carry out 23 theft of data for
connection to banking systems. In the third application that was analysed, Messenger All in One, two
antivirus systems found that the application uses potentially malicious software, the packages
Adware/Loead and Android.fyben.a.
This raises serious concerns about the security of the device, as not all third-party application
distribution platforms perform verification of uploaded applications.
This infrastructure security vulnerability can be exploited by obtaining original (authentic)
applications from the Google Play Store, decompiling the application and then applying the necessary
modifications to the content of the decompiled application by adding malicious code. The application
code with malicious content is then recompiled, packaged and signed with a new private key. The
modified application is uploaded to the above-mentioned third-party application distribution
22
23
VirusTotal information. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/
Clavister information. https://www.clavister.com/advisories/antivirus/view/?id=544073
13NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
platforms. An associative diagram of this process 24 is given in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Associative diagram of malicious code insertion into a mobile application
An application developer compiles the code during application development and thus forms a
functioning application. This application is packaged in the installation file and signed with the
application developer’s private key. The signed installation file for the application can be uploaded to
application stores such as Google Play Store.
An attacker, like all users of application stores (except for relevant regional restrictions) can
download this application; once received from official sources, it is unpacked and decompiled into the
application code. This allows an attacker to perform analysis of the application, to determine the
viability of the installation site of the malicious code and the installation technology to be used, and to
insert malicious code into the application. After completion of malicious code insertion procedures,
the application code is recompiled and packaged into an installation file, which is signed with the
attacker’s private key. The generated malicious application installation file is uploaded to third-party
application distribution platforms, where not all uploaded applications are checked.
Virus-containing e-shops have been found to be a serious problem for these stores 25 . A user
who installs a virus-infected application may suffer from the collection or leaking of data stored in the
device or an associated cloud service, or from damage to the mobile device.
The analysis found that a portion of the mobile applications available in the application
distribution platforms are fakes of original (authentic) applications, with malicious functionality or
virus infestation; such applications can be downloaded and installed by the user on a mobile phone,
thereby jeopardising the security of the device and the data contained in it.
24
Springer info. Repackaging Attack on Android Banking Applications and Its Countermeasures.
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11277-013-1258-x
25
P. Kotzias et al. How Did That Get In My Phone? Unwanted App Distribution on Android Devices.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.10088.pdf
14NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
2.
Devices designed and manufactured in China access servers in third countries. This
allows for the collection and aggregation of user metadata, and based on such data to monitor
users
Analysis of decompiled software and data flows showed that Mi Browser uses two data
collection modules: Google Analytics and Sensors Data. Sensors Data is a platform of Chinese origin,
in functionality close to Google Analytics. According to the Sensors Data company, 26 it has more than
1,500 customers, including some of the largest corporations in the People’s Republic of China, such
as China Telecom, Baidu, CYTS, Sichuan Airlines, etc.
Google Analytics is an analytics platform for programmers or administrators to access
information allowing them to evaluate the use of applications in the iOS, Android or web
environments 27 . Google Analytics automatically generates an event log allowing evaluation of the
performance of an application. It is worth noting that developers have the technical ability to select
the parameters to be analysed, and to set the depth of the analysis of such parameters.
It was found that this module can collect data about user browsing, clicks, etc., and send
information for possible analysis to Google servers. It should be noted that these modules are
activated at the time of initial switching-on of the device, upon consent to participate in the Xiaomi
User Experience programme.
Having decompiled the Xiaomi device’s factory-installed system applications, it was found
that the functionality of these analytics applications was installed and operated in the standard internet
browser of the Xiaomi phone, Mi Browser. Table 5 shows a fragment of Mi Browser code, denoting
the Google Analytics functionality.
Table 5. Fragment of Mi Browser code, denoting the Google Analytics functionality
public static void reportAsync(String str, Map<String, Object> map) {
if if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(str) &AMP;& !BrowserSettings.getInstance.isNotAllowCollectData) {
BrowserReportUtils.stripUrlIfNecessary(map);
BackgroundThread.postOnIOThread(new Runnable(str, map)
{public final/* synthetic * /String f$0;
public final /* synthetic */ Map f$1;
{
this.f$0 = r1;
this.f$1 = r2;
}
Public final void run {
FirebaseReportHelper.report(this.f$0, this.f$1);
}
});
}
}
In the code fragment displayed in the table, the function for sending data to the Firebase analytics
platform on Google servers is implemented. Table 6 shows a fragment of Sensors Data code installed
in the Mi Browser application. In the code fragment, the function that launches Sensors Data
functionality in the Mi Browser application is presented.
Table 6. Fragment of Sensors Data startup code in the Mi Browser application
26
27
Sensors Data information. https://www.sensorsdata.cn/about/aboutus-en.html
Google Firebase information. https://firebase.google.com/docs/analytics/get-started
15NCSC under the MOND
Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
public static void initSensorsDataAPI(final Context context) {
if (context!= null) {
Context applicationContext = context.getApplicationContext;
TRY {
SensorsDataAPI.startWithConfigOptions(applicationContext, new
SAConfigOptions( SA_SERVER_URL ).setAutoTrackEventType(3).enableLog( permissionUtil. isBuildDebu
g(applicationContext).enableTrackScreenOrientation(false));
SensorsDataAPI.sharedInstance.identify(AnonymousID.get application(Context));
setFlushNetworkPolicy(PrivacyAgreement.getInstance.isApproved);
SensorsDataAPI.sharedInstance.setSessionIntervalTime(10000);
registerSuperProperties(applicationContext);
SensorsDataAPI.sharedInstance.unregisterSuperProperty(C4683v.f6510ae);
SensorsDataAPI.sharedInstance.unregisterSuperProperty(uuid);
logout;
SensorsDataAPI.sharedInstance.enableEncrypt(true);
SensorsDataAPI.sharedInstance.persistentSecretKey(new SensorsDataEncrypt . PersistentSecretKey {
public void saveSecretKey .SecreteKey secreteKey {} public
SensorsDataEncrypt. SecreteKey loadSecretKey { return
new SensorsDataEncrypt.SecreteKeycontext .getString (R.string. ABCDEF ), 1);
}
});
} catch (Exception unused) {
}
}
}
The Sensors Data module used in the device has been found to collect statistical information about
61 parameters of the operation of applications used (time of activation of the application, language
used, etc.). A list of data collected by Sensors Data is given in Table 7.
Table 7. List of 61 parameters collected by Sensors Data
No.:
1
2
3 Parameter
log_miaccount
Autocomplete_switch
No_track_switch
4 bookmark_sync
5 history_sync
6 feature_report_switch
7
8 clear_history_switch
personal_service_switch
9 enhanced_incognito_switch
10 system_out_of_ads
Commentary
Is the user logged in
Is automatic text completion enabled
Is the Do Not Track function enabled
Whether bookmark synchronisation with the cloud is
enabled
Whether synchronisation of browsing history with the cloud
is enabled
Is the user participating in the Xiaomi User Experience
programme
Whether history is deleted when the application is closed
Whether programme recommendations are enabled
Whether the browser is running in Enhanced Incognito
mode
Whether the Limit Ad Tracking function is activated. Using
this feature, advertisers do not have access to the device
identifier
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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 swipe_up
current_default_search_engine
language
language_browser
icon_reddot_status
user_newsfeed
user_download_videos
user_night_mode
dark_mode 20 user_data_save_mode 21
22
23
24 user_incognito_mode
user_desktop_mode
user_checkbox_4G
user_push_agree 25 user_facebook_notification 26 user_youtube_signin 27 user_click_interest 28
29
30
31
32
33
34 user_login
adblock_switch
adblock_show_notification
first_enter_newsfeed_way
Fandst_appstart_source
first_appstart_third_party
Miu_personalised 35 personalised_services 36
37
38
39
40
41 browser_ads
protection_type
app_boot_third_party
app_boot
feed_default_channel
experience_improve What function is registered for the swipe-up motion
Current search engine used
Language set in the system
Language setting in the browser

Is the news stream disabled

Whether the browser uses night mode
Whether the system uses night mode
Whether data-saving functionality is activated in the
browser
Is Incognito Mode enabled
Browser’s user-agent
Is browser updating via 4G allowed
Whether browser notifications are activated
Whether Facebook messages have been activated in the
browser
Whether the user is logged in to YouTube
Shows how many times the user clicked on cards in the
browser (news, YouTube recommendations, etc.)
Whether the user is logged in to Mi Account
Is the ad-blocking function activated
Is Adblock enabled
Is the news stream window enabled for the first time


Whether personalised advertising is activated
Whether personalised content recommendations have been
activated



Start-up time of the programme

Is Xiaomi User Experience activated
42
43
44
45
46
47 platform
Miu_version
log_miaccount
MUI_region
EID
apk_name Platform. Always Android
MIUI version
Whether the user is logged in to the Mi account
Mi region

Application APK name
48
49
50 browser_install_referrer
Autocomplete_switch
No_track_switch 51 bookmark_sync 52 history_sync —
Is AutoComplete in the search window activated
Is the Do Not Track function enabled
Is synchronisation of bookmarks with the Mi server
activated
Is synchronisation of browsing history with the Mi server
activated
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53 feature_report_switch 54 clear_history_switch 55 personal_service_switch 56 enhanced_incognito_switch Whether the user participates in the Xiaomi User
Experience programme
Whether browsing history is deleted when the application is
closed
Whether the functionality of user recommendations is
enabled: personalised YouTube clips, etc.
Is Incognito enabled
57
58
59
60
61 user_tab_news
user_tab_games
search_optimization_switch
cookie_status
subscription Has the user enabled the news tab
Has the user enabled the games tab
Constant, always equal to 1
Provides data about user cookie settings
Indicates whether a VPN is used and, if so, its identifier
During the analysis, full decoding and decryption of Xiaomi encrypted messages was carried out.
Xiaomi’s phone has been found to send Sensors Data data in a Base64 dataset, which is additionally
encoded using the urlencode algorithm. An example of a fragment of encoded data sent is given in
Table 8.
Table 8. Fragment of data sent by a Xiaomi phone
zzvhrYfjw6d%2FA8RXtmQLWd2RTDyUWp5DBsFc55eI9yBbDROnrH12GSpq8SRDUtyJ8PquOrUqpsID
g6qvSg%2FksVvDG3gcl6SWzk9uL4hWhOCpEw%2B%2BzMBq0KCtqdOkn4kljhDgt
CfdRixfrJe8PHTjr8x1cK5xMHHlSL0MK%2FWu3utqKnuhf1UQGi64uYDCp%2FeEZ1MdakDE%2BLXsF
4wZKGiftO64
%2B8liP1NvxVl%2BsgTutVEbroI%2FWJUJkz9MfZyvL6OAPG6z9rRbJ354mUo6
%2BOMwZdN%2BAuWSzRz8IKITU6HwNZGMB0xmPDB8tSTM7ehnya%2FyAiHPqOIXD7lYzrvupBJT
rZLCXLQzbTgIxtZG65KvV7yfgiwMhCxY%2Bkg0t3d0LXljOOrQqFfsqdJW%2B6LnWvE6lKdm7
%2BCPydhautVIgiMSZDi94iH%2FuYL%2B2dkmLxSjQFQh51FSBA%2BygRzfCItmL87KjjgT0t3
%2BmtvO%2Bs93lH72rC6ai0Y5kdIIdSuIg6A%2BomC73JYOeHygMR0jmjCjM5
%2FiUANqsH
XPfeoaGBn8F%2FV1vik03CPbetK3yzfwLn9ZpmkmzO64Ic%2BEsRNTgNk7jc0mKZrsisWs4IPO1e
Table 9 shows the decrypted content of data sent by Xiaomi’s phone to Sensors Data servers
located in Singapore. Data sent for analysis: application version, application name, current region,
device manufacturer, etc.
Table 9. Content sent by a Xiaomi phone to Sensors Data servers in Singapore
{
“_track_id”: 1687170607,
for Time: 1623852507838,
for ‘type’: track,
for ‘distinct_id’: ‘7d03ab71-91b1-47ca-8f56-0ce2d77f6c86’,
for Lib: {
For $Lib: Android,
For $lib_version: “4.0.3-pre”,
For $app_version: ‘12.4.1-g’,
For $lib_method: ‘code’,
“$lib_detail”: “com.android.browser.BrowserActivity#####”
},
for Event: “$AppStart”,
for Properties: {
For $Lib: Android,
“$os_version”: ‘10’,
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For $lib_version: “4.0.3-pre”,
For $Model: ‘M2007J3SY’,
‘$s’: Android,
“$screen_width”: 1080,
For $screen_height: 2400,
For $Manufacturer: ‘Xiaomi’,
For $app_version: ‘12.4.1-g’,
for Platform: AndroidApp,
for ‘miui_version’: ‘V12.0.18.0.QJDEUXM’,
“log_miaccount”: 0,
‘miui_region’: “LT”,
for EID: “channel_en_youtube-web”,
“apk_name”: “com.mi.globalbrowser”,
“browser_install_referrer”: Google-play,
“autocomplete_switch”: 1,
“no_track_switch”: ‘2’,
bookmark_sync: 1,
for ‘history_sync’: 1,
‘feature_report_switch’: 1,
“clear_data_switch”: 0,
“personal_service_switch”: 1,
“enhanced_incognito_switch”: 0,
‘hashtag_follow_count’: 0,
‘hashtag_follow_list’: “”,
“account_follow_count”: 0,
“account_follow_list”: “”,
“feed_default_channel”: “”,
For $WiFi: True,
For $network_type: WIFI,
“$resume_from_background”: True,
“$is_first_time”: false,
“$screen_name”: “com.android.browser.BrowserActivity”,
For $title: ‘Mi Browser’,
“$is_first_day”: True
}
}
Sensors Data data was found to be sent to the address https://sa.api.intl.miui.com. Table 10
provides information that characterises the analytical data transmitted over the network to servers
located in Singapore.
Table 10. Characteristics of data sent by Sensors Data
Line
No.:
1
2
3
4
5
IP address Data sent, B
47.241.109.186
161.117.9.4
161.117.84.89
161.117.189.14
161.117.230.146 11789
4318
13386
1230
5294
Data received, B Total data, B State
0 11789
4318
13386
1230
5294 Singapore
The collected statistics are sent through an encrypted channel to Xiaomi servers in Singapore,
which is a country not covered by the General Data Protection Regulation. Potentially excessive
collection and use of analytical data can be said to pose a threat to the privacy of personal data.
Figure 10 shows the Sensors Data data encryption mechanism that was recreated during the
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analysis, used to establish the data link between the device and the servers located in Singapore.
Figure 10: Data encryption mechanism used by Xiaomi
The encrypted dataset is generated by calling Sensors Data software installed in the Mi Browser:
registerSuperProperties and registerDynamicSuperProperties. These functions are responsible for
data collection and preparation of the JSON object. When the dataset is to be sent, it is first converted
into a byte expression and archived using the gzip algorithm.
This is done to reduce the amount of data sent. The result is encrypted using the AES128-CBC
algorithm. A key is generated using the device’s pseudorandom number generator. After that, the key
used in the AES encryption is encrypted by the RSA algorithm, using a public key downloaded from
Xiaomi servers. The resulting dataset is packaged into a JSON object and sent to servers in Singapore.
The application calls the functions registerSuperProperties and registerDynamicSuperProperties.
These functions are responsible for collecting data and preparing JSON objects. It can be said that the
Sensors Data encryption mechanism ensures a relatively high level of data security when transmitting
such data to the analytics servers located in Singapore.
The Google Analytics module installed on the device allows the Mi Browser browsing history,
search results and other parameters of application activity to be read, and to send this data to the
analytics servers. Data is sent via an encrypted TLS channel using Protobuf encoding. Decoding data
without a Protobuf configuration file is impossible or difficult, but certain data can be discerned in the
encrypted stream: the internet address opened in MI Browser, data entered in the search field or an
action performed by the user (e.g., a click on the search field).
This data can be accessed and used by the application developer, Xiaomi. 28 An encoded fragment
of data sent to Google Analytics servers is presented in Table 11.
28
Xiaomi information. https://privacy.mi.com/all/en_US/
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Table 11. Encoded fragment of outgoing data sent by a Xiaomi device to Google Analytics servers
event_network r:LT|285
_oapp _scBrowserActivity _siçÈ3⁄4å°òT
“urlr
:LT| https://nksc.lt/¢þ¦¡/ ý Âicon _oapp op
r:LT|wifi_ifremind r
:LT|remind languager
:LT|en
is_system_languager
:LT|1sourcer:LT|search_icon _oapp op
r:LT|show _scBrowserActivity _siçÈ3⁄4å°òTweb_translate_op2
“ýæ/ñ®ý/event_network
r:
LT|wifi enter_wayr :LT|searchBar_website _oapp _scBrowserActivity _siçÈ3⁄4å°òT imp_search_page Îæýæ/ú
event_network r
:LT|323
_oapp _scBrowserActivity _siçÈ3⁄4å°òT urlr: LT| https://kam.lt
Table 12 presents information characterising the analytical data transmitted by the Xiaomi
device through the network to Google Analytics servers.
Table 12. Characteristics of data sent to Google Analytics servers
Line
No.:
1
2
3
IP address Data sent, B Data received, B Total data, B State
142.250.74.110
172.217.16.14
216.58.207.206 2545
1282
12699 0 2545
1282
12699 the USA
Based on the findings, it can be said that Xiaomi collects a relatively large amount of
information about the processes running on the device, the behaviour of installed software packages,
the actions performed by users and the configuration parameters of applications. Two analytics
systems, Sensors Data and Google Analytics, are used to implement this process. An overview of
sources found that Xiaomi devices collect a wider range of data compared to other manufacturers of
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mobile devices 29, 30, 31 .
Potentially excessive collection and use of analytical data can be said to pose a threat to the
privacy of personal data.
3.
The functionality implemented on a Xiaomi device can limit the free availability of
information
It has been established that during the initialisation of the system applications factory-installed
on a Xiaomi Mi 10T device, these applications contact a server in Singapore at the address
globalapi.ad.xiaomi.com (IP address 47.241.69.153) and download the JSON file
MiAdBlacklistConfig, and save this file in the metadata catalogues of the applications. A list of
applications for which the MiAdBlacklistConfig file was found in metadata catalogues is presented in
Table 13.
Table 13. List of mobile applications using the MiAdBlacklistConfig file
Line
Application name
Application identifier
Device
No.:
1
Security
com.miui.securitycenter
2
Mi Browser
com.mi.globalbrowser
3
Downloads
com.android.providers.downloads.ui
4
Music
com.miui.player
Xiaomi Mi 10T
5
Themes
com.android.thememanager
MIUI Package
6
com.miui.global.packageinstaller
Installer
7
Cleaner
com.miui.cleanmaster
Once the applications have downloaded the file, the download date is recorded in order to facilitate
periodically updating the list. The scheme for downloading the MiAdBlacklistConfig file is shown in
Figure 11.
29
30
31
Apple Privacy Policy. https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/en-ww/
Douglas J. Leith. Mobile Handset Privacy: Measuring the Data iOS
and Android Send to Apple and Google. https://www.scss.tcd.ie/doug.leith/apple_google.pdf
Xiaomi Privacy Policy. https://privacy.mi.com/all/en_IN/
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Figure 11. MiAdBlacklistConfig download scheme
This file contains a list composed of the titles, names and other information of various religious
and political groups and social movements (at the time of the analysis, the MiAdBlacklistConfig file
contained 449 elements). A fragment of the MiAdBlacklistConfig file is shown in Table 14.
Table 14. Fragment of the MiAdBlacklistConfig file
Line
No.:
1
Original Approximate translation
"宗教虔信者阵线", “Front of religious believers”,
...
22
“Free Tibet”,
"西藏自由",
...
60 "蒙古独立", “Independence of Mongolia”,
61 "89民运", “89 Democracy Movement”,
62 "基督灵恩布道团", “Christian charismatic mission”,
...
145
“Islamic League”,
"伊斯兰联盟",
...
201 "民运", “Democratic Movement”,
202 "妇女委员会", “Women’s Committee”,
203 "伊斯兰马格里布基地组织", “Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb”,
204 "人民报", “People’s daily newspaper”,
205 "巴勒斯坦解放组织", “The Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine”,
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...
313
“Long live Taiwan’s independence”,
"台独万岁",
...
369
“The Voice of America”,
"美国之音",
...
420
“89 Movement”,
"89运动",
...
449
"夏米斯丁艾合麦提·阿布都米吉提"
“Xia Misteen Ahemet Abu Dumijiti”
Analysis of the Xiaomi application code showed that the applications have implemented software
classes for filtering the target multimedia displayed on the device based on the downloaded list in the
MiAdBlacklistConfig file. A fragment of this code is shown in Table 16.
Table 16. A fragment of content filtering code used in a Xiaomi device
public boolean mo76794a(INativeAd iNativeAd, C8380a Avar) {
if (iNativeAd == null) {
return true;
}
Long currentTimeMillis = System.currentTimeMillis;
for (String str: new HashSet(this.f11160b))
{if (iNativeAd.getAdTitle!= null &AMP; & m12161a (iNativeAd.getAdTitle, str)
) {MLog.m6439d(MiAdBlacklistConfig, Ads: “ + iNativeAd.getAdTitle + “is blocked by title word: “ + Art);
IF (Avar!= null) {
aVar. f11165a= Art;
}
this.f11161c = Art;
return true;
} other if (iNativeAd.getAdBody!= null &AMP; &m12161a (iNativeAd.getAdBody, str))
{MLog.m6439d(MiAdBlacklistConfig) , Ads: [” + iNativeAd.getAdBody + “] is blocked by desc word: “ +
Art);
IF (Avar!= null) {
aVar. f11165a= Art;
}
this.f11161c = Art;
return true;
}
MLog.m6443i
(MiAdBlacklistConfig, isAdsBlocked—> totalTime=” + (System.currentTimeMillis – currentTimeMillis)+
“&threadId=” + Thread.currentThread.getId);
return false;
}
After analysing the Mi Browser, it was found that the application performs the download
functionality of the MiAdBlacklistConfig file, but does not filter the content according to the list in
the MiAdBlacklistConfig file. Based on the Xiaomi code, this functionality has been deactivated in
“the European Union region”. The event registration content generated by the Mi Browser is
presented in Table 17.
Table 17. Event registration content generated by the Mi Browser
Line
No.:
1
2
Name of
function
MLog.d
MLog.d
Parameter 1 Parameter 2
MiAdBlacklistConfig
ConfigRequestCommon start to request url
UserAgent: Dalvik/2.1.0 (Linux; U; Android 10;
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
MLog.d
MLog.d
MLog.d
MLog.d
MLog.d
I:
I:
I:
M2007J3SY MIUI/V12.0.18.0.QJDEUXM)
handleResponse
request retry: success reset times
response parsed success
updateAdConfig
notifyAllObservers
posid[1.306.1.3],requestAd isPreload: false
AdSwitch expired: new query from remote
AdSwitchOFF is false
MiAdBlacklistConfig
MiAdBlacklistConfig
MiAdBlacklistConfig
MiAdBlacklistConfig
MiAdBlacklistConfig
NativeAdManagerInternal
NativeAdManagerInternal
AdSwitchUtils
...
23 I: AdReportTask
24 I: MIADSDK
25 I: MIADSDK
{“mEvent”:“LOAD_AD”,“mPositionId”:“1,306.1.3”
,“mAppId”:“10000”,“mChannelId”:“miui”,“mOpera
tor”:“246_01”,“mClientVersion”:“100492”,“mSdkV
ersion”:“130200”,“mAdTime”:“1621431087190”,
mModel: M2007J3SY,mGaid:“d3a32b43-6e7e-
4306-82ca-
0f65f1586511”,“mLanguage”:“en_US”,“mBuildSdk
Version”:“29”,“mDoNotTrack”:“false”,“mBuildTyp
e”:“stable”,
muiVersion:“V12.0.18.0.QJDEUXM”,“mRegion”:“
LT”,“mTriggerId”:“9d1f86e3-579e-4110-b71e-
065f520c1fa3”,
“mIsPreload”:“false”,“mCustomKey”:“adsCnt”,“mC
ustomValue”:“0”,“mInstaller”:“com.xiaomi.discover
”,“mIsPreInstall”:0,mElapsed:0,mIsid:0}
Personalised ad is disabled in the EU region,
reporting is not allowed
Personalised ad is disabled in the EU region,
reporting is not allowed
...
{ “mEvent”:“PAGE_VIEW”,“mPositionId”:“1.306.1
38
I:
AdReportTask
.3”,“mAppId”:“10000”,“mChannelId”:“miui”,“mOp
erator”:“246_01”,“mClientVersion”:“100492”,“mSd
kVersion”:“130200”,“mAdTime”:“1621431420870”
, mModel: M2007J3SY,mGaid:“d3a32b43-6e7e-
4306-82ca-
0f65f1586511”,“mLanguage”:“en_US”,“mBuildSdk
Version”:“29”,“mDoNotTrack”:“false”,“mBuildTyp
e”:“stable”,
muiVersion:“V12.0.18.0.QJDEUXM”,mRegion:“LT
”,“mTriggerId”:“9d1f86e3-579e-4110-b71e-
065f520c1fa3”,mInstaller:“com.xiaomi.discover”,“m
IsPreInstall”:0,“mElapsed”:0,“mIsBid”:0,“mCost”: 3
33682 }
It is believed that this functionality allows a Xiaomi device to perform an analysis of the target
multimedia content entering the phone; to search for keywords based on the MiAdBlacklist list
received from the server. Once the device determines that the content contains certain keywords, the
device performs filtering of this content and the user cannot see it. The principle of data analysis
allows analysis not only of words written in letters; the list that is regularly downloaded from the
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server can be formed in any language. It is important to emphasise that this functionality is activated
remotely by the manufacturer. It is believed that the existence of such functionality may jeopardise
free access to information and limit its accessibility. It can be said that this is important not only for
Lithuania, but also for all countries using Xiaomi devices.
4.
On Xiaomi devices, to connect to the cloud, it is necessary to register a SIM card. Sent
messages are not displayed on the phone. The risk of leakage of user data
Studies have shown that when a user chooses to use Xiaomi Cloud services, the user’s mobile
phone number is registered on servers located in Singapore. This is done by the device sending an
encrypted SMS message to a special phone number. The registration procedure for Xiaomi Cloud
services is performed on the Xiaomi device by sending an SMS message as shown in Figure 12.
When a user attempts to connect to the Xiaomi Cloud service for the first time, the device requests
access to a (1) Xiaomi Account. After entering login data and successfully logging in to the account, a
menu window (2) opens in which it is possible to enable and disable the main Xiaomi Cloud
functions: data synchronisation and device geolocation in case of loss of a device.
After selecting the desired functions, the service operating in the background starts the SIM card
data collection procedures (3, 4 and 5). After the service completes the SIM card data collection
procedures, the user is shown an information window (6) indicating that in order to enable the
functionality of call history and message synchronisation, the device must send an SMS to check the
phone number.
It is also indicated in the information window that the user may be charged for sending an SMS
message at the standard rates of the mobile telecommunications operator (provider). When the user
closes the information window, the user is shown an operating system window (7), which asks the
user whether to allow the SIM card registration service to send SMS messages automatically. With
the user’s consent, an automated telephone number registration procedure is launched (8).
The device downloads from the general server the configuration data structure for the procedure,
which includes the address of the server with which further network communication is to be carried
out, the phone number of the SMS addressee and other parameters. The device then generates an SMS
message and sends the message to the phone number specified in the configuration data structure (9).
The sent message is immediately deleted from the sent message log.
At the same time, the collected SIM card data is stored in the internal service database (10). After
sending the SMS message, its content is encrypted and sent to a server, the address of which is
specified in the configuration data structure, together with a query for confirmation of registration
(11).
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Figure 12. Registration procedure for Xiaomi Cloud services performed on a phone by sending an
SMS message
After sending a registration query to the server, the device receives a response to the query, displaying
a registration result (positive or negative) (12).
It has been established that the registration of a telephone number is carried out regardless of how
the user chooses to be authenticated, either by phone number or by e-mail address. It is important to
note that the sent encrypted SMS message and its addressee are not visible to the user. At the time of
the analysis, after disabling the functionality of the Xiaomi Cloud service, the sending of messages
was not observed. A more detailed network flow diagram is given in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Registration scheme for the Xiaomi Cloud services network
Once the phone number registration process has started, the device sends a query to a general
server located in Singapore (1), from which it receives a data structure as a response. This data
structure includes the address of the target server for this service, the number of the telephony server
and other parameters used for the registration procedure (2). The device then generates and sends an
SMS message to the phone number specified in the received data structure (3). The message sent is
immediately deleted from the sent message log (4). After sending the message, the device contacts the
server located in Singapore and sends to the telephony server the encrypted content of the sent
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message (5). The server communicates with the telephony server to which the SMS message was sent
(6, 7). During the communication, the message sent by telephone is checked and the encrypted
content of the message is sent by means of the mobile internet network. After successful verification
of the messages, the device is given a response to the query, adding on the registration result (8).
It is important to note that if the SIM card is not installed on the device at the time of
registration, the registration process is terminated and the device displays an error message.
Before the device sends the phone number registration SMS message, the device contacts the general
server located in Singapore, the address of which is api.account.xiaomi.com (IP address:
161.117.97.141 ).
During communication, the device downloads the configuration data structure required for the
registration process. This data structure includes the telephone number of the telephony server, the
server address and other data. An extract of the network communication data from the device to the
general server is shown in Table 18.
Table 18. Extract of configuration download network traffic
Get/pass/configuration HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Dalvik/2.1.0 (Linux; U; Android 10; M2007J3SY MI/V12.0.18.0.QJDEUXM) APP/unknown
MK/TWkgMTBU
Cookie: sdkVersion=accountsdk-2020.01.09
Host: api.account.xiaomi.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 05 May 2021 09:48:42 GMT
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-Alive
Content-Encoding: gzip
{“result”:“ok”,“code”:0,“date”:{“”mo“:{”460(03|05|11)“:[”“10690329119863”,“10690329119867”,“10690329
119868”,“10690329119862”,“520(05|18|47)”:[“”1614813“],”708[0-9]+:[“+ 50494340090”,“425[0-
9]+:[”+ 972559882264“],”255[0—
<...>
9]+:["+ 8804445652000","+ 8804445652019"],"262[0-9]+:["+ 4915735981865"],"216[0-
9]+:["+ 36305555538","450[0-9]+:["15996816","246[0-9]+:[”+ 37066803015“,”206[0-
9]+:[“+ 32460225522”],“226[0-9]+:[”+ 40371700668“],”440[0-9]+“:[”+ 819070094460“,”260[0-
9]+:[“+ 48666068953”,“40[45][0-9]+:[”+ 918652202112“,”56161974“],”502(0|1|2[0-9])[0-
9]*“:[”+ 601117225668“],”250[0-9]+:[“+ 79037672679”,“+ 447491163442”,
<...>
9]+:"sgpac.account.xiaomi.com","262[0-9]+":"sgpac.account.xiaomi.com","216[0-
9]+":"sgpac.account.xiaomi.com","450[0-9]+":"sgpac.account.xiaomi.com",”246[0-
9]+:"sgpac.account.xiaomi.com",”206[0-9]+:“sgpac.account.xiaomi.com”,“226[0-
9]+”:“sgpac.account.xiaomi.com”,“440[0-9]+”:“sgpac.account.xiaomi.com”,“260[0-
9]+”:“sgpac.account.xiaomi.com”,“40[45][0-9]+:”inac.account.xiaomi.com“,”502(0~1|2[0—
<...>
The device sends an SMS message to the phone number specified in the configuration data
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structure.
During the analysis of the phone number registration service Xiaomi SIM Activation Service, it was
established that the device performs the function of automatic sending of an SMS message. The
addressee of the SMS message and the content of the message are shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14. Content of the SMS message and process of sending
After analysing the decompiled factory-installed system service Xiaomi SIM Activation
Service, it was found that the application performs the function of automatic sending of an SMS
message using the external software class miui.telephony.SmsManager, which is not compiled and is
archived in the service installation file.
A fragment of the code for sending the SMS message is given in Table 19.
Table 19. Fragment of the code for sending the SMS message
public void sendTextMessage(int i, String str2, String str3, PendingIntent pendingIntent, PendingIntent
pendingIntent2) {
try {
class<?> cls = Class.forName(miui.telephony.SmsManager));
Object raise = cls.getDeclaredMethod(getDefault, new Class {Integer.TYPE}).invoke((Object) null, new
Object{Integer.valueOf(i)});
CLS.getMethod( sendTextMessage , new Class{String. class, String. class, String. class, PendingIntent. class,
PendingIntent. class}.invoke(invoke, new Object{str, str2 , str3, pendingIntent, pendingIntent2));
Log.d(MiuSysImpl, “successfully send text message”);
} catch (NoSuchMethodException e) {
Log.e(MiuSysImpl), “error when send text message: NoSuchMethodException, e);
throw new RuntimeException(e);
} catch (IllegalAccessException e2) {
Log.e(MiuSysImpl), “error when send text message: IllegalAccessException, e2);
throw new RuntimeException(e2);
} catch (InvocationTargetException e3) {
Log.e(MiuSysImpl), “error when send text message: InvocationTargetException, e3);
throw new RuntimeException(e3);
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e4) {
Log.e(MiuSysImpl), “error when send text message: ClassNotFoundException, e4);
throw new RuntimeException(e4);
} catch (SecurityException e5
) {ActivateLog.m24w(MiSysImpl,sendTextMessage,e5);
}
}
It is worth noting that in the above-mentioned external software class miui.telephony.SmsManager,
there is an implemented functionality allowing deletion of SMS messages. The functions of sending
and deleting SMS messages, and other functions implemented in the external software class
miui.telephony.SmsManager, are shown in Figure 15.
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Innovation and Training Division
support@ims.nksc.lt
Figure 15. Functions of sending and deleting SMS messages, and other functions, implemented in the
external software class miui.telephony.SmsManager
When the device sends an SMS message to the phone number specified in the configuration
data structure, the device sends the encrypted content of the SMS message to the address
sgpac.account.xiaomi.com (Singapore).
The server performs content verification against the received encrypted data with the SMS
message data received by the telephony server and sends the activation result to the mobile device. An
extract of the network traffic is given in Table 20.
Table 20. Communication with the server located in Singapore
Post/pass/activation/report HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Dalvik/2.1.0 (Linux; U; Android
MK/TWkgMTBU
Cookie: sdkVersion=accountsdk-2020.01.09
Host: sgpac.account.xiaomi.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Content-Length: 346
10;
M2007J3SY
MI/V12.0.18.0.QJDEUXM)
APP/unknown
DevID=VqFuDPTDczp39bXc&features=CALL_LOG_SYNC++MMS_SYNC+&mnc=24601&activationMode=uplink&
simId=F_9M83JIJb_VOKce&smsBodyEncrypted=fu_5ODSHBbJv5XO6wRTIUfNCEerj978hkm5RhLrK19IYsgPUeVQ
oXbY9Di8-
B9WaMvgJeAVwudc_nYD9LWJww28gYA9A9V1kqzNCf8e1tfLftN_Y0UXpvy4cXlHISL5yiGj2sI77KFzS20PgKfocT
xNcleEuLlTEjTY_38 %3D& action=vkey%3Aok%2Cverify%3A14 %2Cdone%3A14HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 05 May 2021 09:50:27 GMT
Content-Type: application/json
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-Alive
Content-Encoding: gzip
{“result”:“ok”,“code”:0,“date”:{},“description”:“......”}
During the analysis, it was established that the device communicated with servers located in
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Singapore. The list of identified communications is given in Table 21.
Table 21. Information about communications with servers located in Singapore
Line
Data,
Domain
Address
State
No.:
Bytes
Purpose
General server
1 api.account.xiaomi.com
2 sgpac.account.xiaomi.co
m
161.117.97.141
161.117.97.227
9200
48990
Singapore
Singapore
Configuration
for
authentication is sent from
the server to the phone: SMS
tel. number, server address,
etc.
Server
Based on the SMS message
received from the phone, a
registration response is
generated and sent to the
phone.
IP addresses belonging to the domains api.account.xiaomi.com and sgpac.account.xiaomi.com are
registered with Alibaba.com Singapore E-Commerce Private Limited. Alibaba is an information
technology company established in 1999 in the People’s Republic of China. It is known that Chinese
IT companies are obliged to transfer any form of information under the companies’ control to the
Chinese government or its intelligence agencies 32 .
Automated sending of messages and its concealment by means of software pose potential threats to
the security of the device and personal data; in this way, without the user’s knowledge, device data
can be collected and transmitted to remote servers.
32
The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/the-real-danger-of-chinas-national-intelligence-law/
32
[*/quote*]
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